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IN THE SUPRF:MF, COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 18998

TIMOTHY AND MILDRED LAIRBY,
Defendants-Appellants.:

SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY
RESTRICT APPELLANTS' CROSS-F:XAMINATION OF
CERTAIN WITNESSES AND THUS DENY THEM THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION.
"The right to cross-examination is an invaluable
right embodied in Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution which assures the right to confrontation."
v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1977).

State

However, the

extent of cross-examination rests largely in the discretion of
the trial judge, who is allowed considerable latitude in
imposing reasonable limits on cross-examination.

State v.

starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015, 1017 (1978); State v. Curtis,
Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975).

And unless the trial judge

clearly abused his discretion, his or her rulings will not be
reversed.

Ibid.
Appellants argue that there were several instances

during their trial when the judge improperly restricted
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cross-examination and thus denied them their constitutional
right of confrontation.

They first cite a portion of defense

counsel's cross-examination of Wanda Lairby, Virginia ("Lisa")
Lairby's natural mother, which they allege is an example of
improper restriction of cross-examination as to bias,
interest, and motive to fabricate.

However, appellants fail

to quote the entire exchange between the judge and their

,

counsel.

The following appears in the trial

immediately after the last statement quoted in Appellants'
Supplemental Brief at page 3:
MR. LIONEL FARR: Well, if there is a
question of custody and if she's biased
for these children to stay with her and
not go with him, to indicate somewhat her
attitude towards these children being with
him or even the least irritation at all.
I would like to know whether she's biased
and check it out.
THE COURT: Well, I suppose if you
want to go into the subject of why the
visitation was stopped, I suppose that
would be appropriate, but I don't know
that your approach at the moment is
relative or relevant.

(R. 141-142).
The judge's comments indicate that he did not intend
to prohibit cross-examination of the witness for possible
bias.

He was, however, legitimately concerned that the

cross-examination be orderly and relevant.

As is well settled

law, the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination

does not entitle a defendant "to embark on fishing
expeditions."

See State v. Clayton, Utah, 658 P.2d 621, n23

(1983).

A foundation must fir-st be established upon which to

base the r-elevancy of questions dur-ing cr-oss-examination.
Ibid.
Appellants seem to be ar-guing that the judge
completely for-eclosed the possibility of questioning Wanda
Lairby about a pending custody hearing.

Given his comments

after he sustained the State's objection to

counsel's

question about that matter-, it appears the judge simply was
seeking fur-ther- foundation to support the relevancy of the
inquiry.

His suggestion that counsel explore "why visitation

was stopped" supports this conclusion.

Mor-eover, even if it

was err-or to sustain an objection to counsel's question, the
issue of a pending custody hear-ing was fully explored in latercross-examination of Wanda Lair-by (see R. 403-406).
error was not pr-ejudicial.

Thus, any

See State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d at

746.
Appellants' references to portions of defense
counsel's attempted cr-oss-examination of Lisa Lairby, Dr.
William Palmer-, and Violet Jones as examples of improper
r-estriction of cr-oss-examination are similarly without merit.
Certain questions put to those witnesses were not allowed on
the ground that they went beyond the scope of direct or
redirect examination.

This is in accord with the

long-standing general rule in Utah that the scope of
cross-examination is limited to the subject matter of the
direct examination.

see state v. Bleazard, 103 Utah 113, 133

P.2d 1000, 1002 (1943): Rule 43(b), Utah Rules of Civil
-3-

Procedure (which is applicable to criminal proceedings under
Rule 8l(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure); Rule 611, Utah
Rules of Evidence (1983).

Significantly, appellants made no

argument to the trial court that the questions were
permissible as exceptions to this general rule--e.g., inquiry
into matters affecting the credibility of the witness.

see

State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d at 746.
Finally, the questioning of Richard Long about a
visitation rights agreement and his living with another person
was not permitted on the ground that it was not relevant or
material (see R. 539).

Appellants failed to show

satisfactorily how those questions were relevant to either the
witness's credibility or the issues of the case (R. 428-431).
The relevancy of those questions was far from obvious.

Thus,

appellants, having not laid sufficient foundation for
relevancy, were not improperly restricted in their
cross-examination of Long.

See State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d at

623.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SECURE THE
ATTENDANCE OF AN OUT-OF-STATE WITNESS WAS
NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Appellants claim the trial court erred in refusing
to secure for them the attendance of an out-of-state witness,
Tracy Long (who apparently was in Arizona), pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. S 77-21-3 (1982)

(Arizona has also adopted the

-4-

Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without
a State in Criminal Proceedings.
§

see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

13-40Cl 2 ( l'l56), as amended).
As the State noted in it's initial brief, the duty

to present a defense devolves upon the defendant, who is
responsible for the production of witnesses in his behalf.
See Respondent's Brief at page 15.

Because

raised for

the first time on appeal will not be considered by
Court, appellants'

this

failure to bring to the attention of the

trial judge the procedures provided for in S 77-21-3, of which
he apparently was unaware (see R. 236), should preclude
consideration of the argument they now present on appeal.
See State v. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252 (1983). Furthermore,
appellants made no showing at trial, nor do they make any
here, that Tracy Long was a material witness (a requirement of
S 77-21-3).

They simply state that her anticipated testimony

would have been material and relevant (see R. 235; Appellants'
Supplemental Brief at p. 11).

Under these circumstances,

appellants' suggestion that the trial court's failure to
secure the attendance of Tracy Long pursuant to

§

77-21-3

should result in a reversal of their convictions is without
merit.

-5-

POINT TII
THE TRIAL COIJRT DID NOT DFNY APPFLLANTS
THEIR RIGHT TO PRESENT CHARACTFR EVIDENCE,
NOR DID IT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVF AN
INSTRUCTION ON CHARACTER WITNFSS FVlDFNCE.

Appellants refer to several pages of the trial
transcript to support their claim that the trial court unduly
restricted their presentation of character evidence.

I t is

somewhat difficult to respond to this claim because appellants
do not demonstrate with any specificity how the trial court
may have erred in this regard.

However, a review of those

references to the transcript reveals that objections to
defense counsel's attempts to elicit character testimony were
sustained on the legitimate grounds that insufficient
foundation had been laid to qualify the witness and that the
questions were not relevant to the reputation of the accused.
As noted in state v. Goodliffe, Utah, 578 P.2d 1288 (1978):
[T]he accepted prooedure in eliciting
testimony of one's reputation as it
pertains to his character or a trait of
his character that is in issue is to first
qualify the witness by determining if he
is acquainted with the reputation of the
person in question, and if so, then to
have him relate what that reputation is.
However appropriate it may be to prove a
character trait in issue by testimony in
the form of an opinion, it is not
appropriate to elicit from the witness his
individual opinion as to what the person's
reputation is in regard thereto.
578 P.2d at 1291.

See also State v.

(1981).

-6-

Lopez, Utah, 626 P.2d 483

In short, appellants'

failure to lay proper

foundation for chararter testimony and to ask questions that
were relevant to appellants'

character restricted the

introduction of character evidence.
impermissibly restrict appellants'
evidence.

Cf. State v.

The court did not
right to present character

Ervin, 22 Utah 2d 216, 451 P.2d 372

( 1969).
Appellants'

further argument concerning the failure

to give an instruction on character witness evidence
noted
p.

in the State's initial brief

19), without merit.

is, as

(see Respondent's Brief at

The following additional comments are

intended to supplement the arguments made in that

initial

brief.
It is generally agreed that unless the defendant has
presented competent character evidence sufficient to support a
character evidence instruction,
such an instruction.

he or she is not entitled to

See, e.g., Conner v. State, Ga., 303

S.E.2d 266 (1983): State v. Williams, 299 N.C. 652,
774

(1980); cf. State v. Stone, Utah 629 P.2d 442,

263 S.E.2d
(19fll)

(which held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on
his theory of the case
requested instruction).
this basic requirement,
refusing

if there is evidence to support the
Because appellants did not satisfy
the trial court did not err in

to give a character evidence instruction.

-7-

However, even if this Court were to find that
error not to give the requested instruction,

it was

appellants were

not prejudiced since even without the error there was no
"reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant[s] ."

State v. Fontana, Utah,

p. 2d

, No. 177'lfi,

slip op. at p. 9 (decided March 2, 1984), quoting State v.
Hutchison, Utah, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (1982).

See
, also State v.

Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (1980).

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS CONCERN ING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
WERE PROPER.
A.

DR. WILLIAM PALMER'S OPINION TESTIMONY
WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED.

or. William Palmer, a physician employed at Primary
Children's Hospital and the University of Utah School of
Medicine and who was also a member of the Child Protection
Team of the University of Utah and Primary Children's Medical
Center ( R. 320), testified that,
had been sexually abused (R.

in his op in ion, Lisa La irby

335).

That opinion was based in

large part on what Lisa Lairby told him during his examination
of her, which included a physical examination of the vagina
(R. 329, 334, 337).

Appellants contend that Dr. Palmer should

not have been allowed to give his opinion because insufficient
foundation had been laid as to whether the statements Lisa
Lairby made to him are typically relied upon by experts in
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determining whether sexual ahllse has occurred.
Information normally relied upon by a physician in
the course of his professional duties may provide the basis
for expert opinion testimony in the courtroom.

In Edwards v,

Diderickson, Utah, <;q7 P.2d 1328 (l97'l), this Court said:
We recognize that expert evidence is
sometimes justifiably based in part on
evidence obtained outside the
courtroom--even evidence of the
adjudicatory facts in dispute.
But such
evidence is usually the type that an
expert relies upon as a matter of course
in forming opinions and is
sufficiently
reliable to warrant an opinion based
thereon.
see,
Jenkins v. United
States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 300, 307 F.2d
United States v. Aluminum Co.
of American, 35 F.Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y.
194 0).
597 P.2d at 1332 n.2.

The following excerpt from Dr. Palmer's

testimony indicates that statements from a child who is being
examined for sexual abuse are normally relied upon by experts
in the field

in determining whether abuse has actually

occurred:

0.

Did you say that your

opinion, then, was influenced by what the
child said to you?
A.

Yes, my opinion was

influenced by what the child said to me,
yes.

o.

was your opinion based

-9-

entirely upon what the child said to you?
A.

My opinion was based upon

what the child said to me in terms of my
experience with other children who are
sexually abused.
Q.
see.

okay.

But was it based--I

Then it was based also on what other

children have said to you?
A.

It's based upon the fact

that if I excluded physical evidence and
only made an assessment as to sexual
abuse having occurred in children who are
not experienced sexually and since most
sexual abuse does not involve penetration,
then I would be excluding 80 percent of
children who are sexually abused.

o.

so, what you are saying as

far as this-A.

I'm saying my experience, my

experience after seeing children who have
been sexually abused is that children
whose behavior, and that includes
vocabulary and way of expressing things in
terms of their genital area, when the
behavior is beyond that which would be

-10-

acceptable as normal,

if you will, in a

sexual sense in a given age group, then
that has--yes, that has to influence a
concern,

It is one of the indicators of

sexual abuse.

(R.

338-339).

See also testimony of Christine Swanson (R.

303-311).
The trial judge could justifiably have found that
the interpretation of statements made by possible victims of
child abuse to an examining physician, and the conclusions to
be drawn therefrom,

are "within the scope of the special

knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the
[physician] witness."
(1971).

Rule 56(2)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence

The trial judge's ruling with respect to Dr. Palmer's

testimony is in accord with the principle that the
determination of the suitability of expert testimony in a case
and the qualificiation of the proposed expert are within the
sound discretion of the trial court.
Utah, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (1982).

See State v. Clayton,

As noted in Clayton:

In State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d
865 (1959), this Court held that where it
appeared to the trial court that there was
a reasonable foundation for the opinion of
the expert witness, it was within the
discretion of the court to admit the
opinion and allow any frailties therein to
be exposed on cross-examination.
"The
faults in it . • • go to its weight rather
than to its competency." 10 Utah 2d at
38, 347 P.2d at 868.
-11-

646 P.2d at 726.
Finally, appellants characterize or. Palmer's
testimony as opinion on whether Lisa Lairby was telling the
truth.

The record simply does not support that conclusion.

Dr. Palmer's gave his opinion on whether the child had been
sexually abused, nothing more,
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY QUASHED
APPELLANTS' SUBPOENA OF DR.
LIEBRODER.
Dr. Barbara Liebroder, who had conducted a
psychological examination of Wanda Lairby but not of Lisa
Lairby (see R. 574, 580), was subpoenaed to testify by
appellants.

After a lengthy discussion between the court and

counsel about the content and purpose of the proposed
testimony fran nr. Liebroder, the court granted the witness's
motion to quash the subpoena (R. 571-583).

It becomes obvious

after reviewing that discussion that appellants' sole purpose
for calling Dr. Liebroder was to elicit from her an opinion on
Wanda Lairby's credibility.

The court clearly quashed the

subpoena on the grounds that it was improper to have a
psychologist tell the jury whether a witness was telling the
truth (R. 582-583).
It is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to
determine the credibility of the witnesses.
Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982).

State v. Howell,

Therefore, it was entirely

proper for the trial court not to allow Dr. Liebroder to
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testify.

As noted in State v.

Filson, Idaho, 613 P.2d 938

( 1980) :
A psychiatrist's testimony on the
credibility of a witness may involve many
dangers: the psychiatrist's testimony may
not be relevant; the techniques used and
theories advanced may not be generally
accepted; the psychiatrist may not be in
any better position to evaluate
credibility than the juror; difficulties
may arise in communication between
psychiatrist and the jury; too muchreliance may be placed upon the testimony
of the psychiatrist; partisan
psychiatrists may cloud rather than
clarify issues; the testimony may be
distracting, time-consuming and costly.
613 P.2d at 942 n.3.

Furthermore, appellants'

reliance on

State v. Miller, Utah, 677 P.2d 1129 (1984), as support for
their claim that a psychologist should be al lowed to testify
on a witness's credibility is misplaced.

The Miller decision

dealt with psychiatric testimony concerning the defendant's
ability to form the intent required to commit the charged
offense.

It did not address the issue of psychiatric

testimony on the credibility of a witness.

POINT

V

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION
FOR A PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF WANDA AND
LISA LAIRBY.
There are essentially three views on the matter of
ordering a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness
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in a sex crime case:

(1) the court has no inherent power to

compel a psychiatric examination; (2) the defendant has an
absolute right to an order compelling a psychiatric
examination of the complaining witness; and (3) the trial
judge has the discretion to order a psychiatric examination
when a compelling reason is shown.
Kan. 481, 602 P.2d 85, 89 (1979).

See State v. Gregg, 226
The latter,, and better,

view, which is fully discussed in Ballard v. Superior Court,
64 Cal.2d 159, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 (1966), has
been adopted in the vast majority of jurisdictions.
602 P.2d at 89.

Gregg,

Under that view, whether an examination is

ordered "is within the sound discretion of the trial court"
and a mot ion requesting the examination "should be granted
only upon a substantial showing of need and justification,
which is not a light burden."
305 N.W.2d 677, 679 (1981).

State v. Wounded Head, S.D.,
"The principle established by the

majority of the cases is that the judge has the discretion to
order such an examination, although the failure to do so has
rarely been held an abuse of discretion."

Ballard v.

Superior Court, 64 Cal.2d at 177, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313, 410
P.2d at 849, quoting State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 223, 229, 132
N.W.2d 847, 850 (1965).

Finally, the purpose of the

psychiatric examination "is to detect any mental or moral
delusions or tendencies causing distortion of the imagination
that would affect the probable credibility of the complaining
witness."

State v. Wounded Head, 305 N.W.2d at 679.
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This rourt's discussion in State v. Hubbard, utah,
601 P. 2d 9 2g ( lg7g), of whether it was error for a trial judge
to refuse to order a psychiatric examination to determine
competency of a witness indicates that the majority view
applies

in Utah as well:
We do not question that if it were made to
appear that there is a substantial doubt
that a witness is capable of
and appreciating the duty to tell the
truth, or that he is able to perceive,
remember and communicate facts with
reasonable accuracy, the trial judge might
grant a request for such an examination
before permitting him to testify.
However, in the very nature of such an
inquiry, and the prerogatives which belong
in the first instance to the trial judge,
and secondly to the jury, of judging the
credibility of witnesses, the
determination as to whether such an
examination should be had must necessarily
rest largely within the discretion of the
trial judge.

601 P.2d at 930.

see also State v. Wilkerson, Utah, 612 P.2d

362, 364 (1980), where the Court said:

"The trial court has

substantial discretion in examining the ability of the child
to perceive and truthfully relate facts."
It does not appear from the record that appellants
presented a compelling reason for ordering psychiatric
examinations of Wanda and Lisa Lairby (see R. 9, 231-233).
They offered nothing more than that, based upon a
psychological evaluation they had of Wanda Lairby, they

-15-

believed a "folie a deux"l might exist between Wanda and
Lisa.

This simply did not rise to the level of a compelling

reason to order examinations.

The evidence referred to by

appellants is wholly insufficient to conclude that
examinations were required to determine whether some
psychological abnormality affected the credibility of those
witnesses.

see State v. Wounded Head, 305 N.W.2d
at 677.
,

Appellants' motion was clearly a fishing expedition, which
should not be countenanced by the trial courts.

See State v.

Gregg, 602 P.2d at 92.
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court, with no
compelling reason before it, did not abuse its considerable
discretion in refusing to order psychiatric examinations of
Wanda and Lisa Lairby.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
ONLY A PORTION OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY
APPELLANT TIMOTHY LAIRRY.
It is generally recognized that when a portion of a
writing, conversation, or statement is introduced by one
party, the other party may request introduction of the whole,
subject to two qualifications:

"The portions sought to be

admitted (1) must be relevant to the issues and (2) only those

1 A folie a deux is "the presence of the same or similar
delusional ideas in two
associated with one another."
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1981).
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parts which qualify or explain the subject matter of the
portion offered by the nppnnent need be admitted,"

united

States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 70R, 710 (7th Cir, 1981), citing
United States v.

511 F.2d 482, 486-487 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied, 421 U.S. 821i (lg75).

See also Rule 106, utah

Rules of Evidence (lg83).
At issue here is a letter written by appellant
Timothy Lairby.

It

is not clear from the record which party

offered the letter for introduction into evidence (see R. 92
which indicates the State did, and R. 768 which indicates
appellants did).

It is clear, however, that the trial court

received only a portion of the letter, over appellants'
objection (see R. 768-769).

Appellants apparently never

specified to the trial court why the exclllr1ed portions of the
letter were relevant and how they served to qualify or explain
the subject matter of the portion admitted.
On appeal, appellants fail to show that the two
qualifications to the general rule expressed in Walker were
satisfied in this case.

Furthermore, the letter (particularly

the excluded portion) was not included in the record on
appeal.

This Court has repeatedly said that it cannot rule on

a question when there is an inadequate record upon which to
resolve it.

see State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267

(1982); State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (1982);
State v. Mitchell, Utah, 671 P.2d 213 (1983).

Therefore, thi.s

court should not consider appellants' argument concerning
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admission of only a portion of the letter.
Finally, even if this Court were to find that the
trial court erred, the error was harmless.

In the context of

the entire case, it can be safely concluded that exclusion of
portions of the letter had little effect on the outcome of the
trial.

Certainly, the excluded evidence would not have had a

substantial influence in bringing about a dif!erent verdict,
and thus reversal is not in order.

Rule 5, Utah Rules of

Evidence (1971); Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983);
State v. Fontana, Utah,

P.2d

, No. 17796, slip op. at

p.9 (decided March 2, 1984).

POINT VII
LISA LARIBY'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT SO
INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE AS TO WARRANT
UPSETTING THE JURY'S VERDICT.
Appellants• argument in Point VIII of their brief is
two-fold.

First, the point heading suggests that appellants

believe the trial judge should not have allowed Lisa Lairby, a
6-year old child, to testify.

However, appellants made no

objection to her testifying, either in a pretrial motion or
when she took the stand at trial.

This Court will not review

the admissibility of evidence that was not objected to at
trial.

State v. Bingham, Utah,

P.2d

, No. 18774, slip

op. at p.6; State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 947
(1982).

Because "the facts are not such that great and
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manifest injustice would be done if this court does not
entertain the issue sua sponte as an exception,"

State v.

Pierce, Utah, fi55 P.2d fi7fi, fi77 (1982), the first prong of
appellants' argument should not he considered.
Second, appellants argue that Lisa Lairby's
testimony was so inherently improbable that there must have
been a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.

Tpis argument

ignores the wide latitude that has traditionally been afforded
courts in admi.tting the testimony of children.

see State v.

Wilkerson, Utah, 612 P.2d 3fi2, 364 (1980); State v. McMillan,
Utah, 588 p.2d 162, 163-164 (1978); people v. Ortega, Colo.
App., 672 P.2d 215, 218 ( 1983).

AS a practical matter, a

reviewing court should be particularly tolerant of a child
witness's use of terms not normally used by adults when it
addresses the question of whether the child's testimony is
inherently improbable--especially in sexual abuse cases.

A

child may perceive and relate facts differently than would an
adult, but that does not prevent a child from testifying
truthfully, accurately, and in a manner that can be understood
by the jury.

Nor does it prevent a jury from determining

beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts testified to by the
child have in fact occurred.
Appellants focus on Lisa Lairby's "child-like"
descriptions of what appellant Timothy Lairby had done to her
as examples of inherently improbable testimony.

However, her

use of the word "winky" instead of "penis," or the word "puke"
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instead of "ejaculate," does not render her testimony
unbelievable and therefore insufficient to support appellants'
conviction.

Those terms might reasonahly he used by a 6-year

old child to describe what must have been an extremely
traumatic experience.

Additionally, the conflicts between her

testimony and that of other witnesses were questions for the
jury to resolve and were not of sufficient
warrant upsetting the jury's verdict.
649 P.2d at 97.

to

See State v. Howell,

As noted by this Court in State v.

Middlestadt, Utah, 579 P.2d 908 (1978):
In general, the common-law supports the
contention that a conviction may be
sustained upon the uncorroborated
testimony of the victim, and that such
evidence is not insubstantial simply
because the testimony is conflicting in
some respects.
As to the quality of the
testimony given, it is settled that it
must be so improbable that it is
completely unbelievable before it is
insufficient to uphold a conviction.
579 P.2d at 911.

See also State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d at 164.

POINT VIII
UNDER THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF AN
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM,
APPELLANTS' CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
The governing legal standards applicable to a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel were recently summarized
by this Court in Codianna v. Morris, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101
(1983):
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This Court has previously held in a
murder case involvinq appointed counsel
that an accused "is entitled to the
assistanrP of a rompetent member of the
Bar, who shows a willingness to identify
himself with the interests of the accused
and present such 14efenses as are available
under the law and consistent with the
ethics of the profession."
State v.
McNicol, !Jtah, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (197fi).
Accord, State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918
(1979); Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118,
449 P.2d 241 ( 19fi9).
The McNicol
has
a subjective element--"willingness to
identify himself with the interests of the
accused"--and an obJective element--"
competent member of the Bar." The
objective element is measured both by
general ability or experience and by
performance in the defense of a particular
case.
Both elements (willingness to
identify with the accused, and competence)
a re es sent i al to adequate represent at ion.
The McNicol test, which we reaffirm,
includes all of the requirments the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
identified in its recent redefinition of
the constitutional requirements of
effective assistance of counsel.
rejecting the "sham and mockery" test that
had previously been applied in the Tenth
and other circuits, the court held:
"The
Sixth Amendment demands that defense
cousel exercise the skill, judgmenr and
diligence of a reasonably competent
defense attorney."
Dyer v. Crisp, 613
F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (en bane).
Relying on Dyer v. Crisp, supra, and
other authorities, our recent oprr;TOn in
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 58
( 1982), identifies the following
considerations necessary to determine
whether a conviction should be reversed or
set aside on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel:
(1) The burden of
establishing inadequate representation is
on the defendant, "and proof of such must
be a demonstrable reality and not a
speculative matter."
State v. McNicol,
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554 P.2d at 204.
(2) A lawyer's
"legitimate exercise of jugdment" in the
choice of trial strategy or tactics that
did not produce the anticipated result
does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at
205.
( 3) It must appear that any
deficiency in the performance of counsel
was prejudicial. State v. Forsyth, Utah,
560 P.2d 337, 339 (1977); Jaramillo v.
Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 22, 465 P.2d 343,
345 (1970).
In this context, prejudice
means that without counsel's error there
was a "reasonable likelihood that there
would have been a different result
State v. Gray, 601 P.2d at 920.
S1m1larly, as we noted in State v.
Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 58, "the failure of
counsel to make motions or objections
which would be futile if raised does not
constitute ineffective assistance.
660 P.2d at 1109.

These standards parallel those set forth by

the united States Supreme Court in its recent decision of
Strickland v. Washington,
14, 1984).

U.S.

, 35 CrL 3066 (decided May

Under the Sixth Amendment a defendant is entitled

to "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel.

However, a

reviewing court's analysis of an ineffective assistance claim
is two-tiered.

As stated in Strickland:

A convicted defendant's claim that
counsel's assistance was so defective as
to require reversal of a conviction or
death sentence has two components.
First,
the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning
as the •counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors
were so serious as to deprive the
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defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliab1.,.
Unless a defendant
makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the conviction or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process tha• renders the result
u n re 1 i ab le .
35 CrL at 3071.

Significantly, the second component of

demonstrable prejudice was adopted by this Court in Codianna,
660 l'.2d at llog.

Thus, appellants' argument,that they should

not have to show prejudice is not only inconsistent with the
law of this state, but is now also contrary to the latest
pronouncement on the issue from this country's highest court.
Several factors stressed in the Strickland opinion
are particularly important.

An attorney's performance should

be evaluated in terms of reason ab le nes s
the circumstances.•

35 CrL at 3071.

ide ring al 1 of

"Judicial scrutiny of

counsel's performance must be highly deferential."
307 2.

A convicted defendant making a claim of
ineffective assistance must identify the
acts or omissions of counsel that are
alleged not to have been the result of
reasonable professional judgment. The
court must then determine whether, in
light of all the circumstances, the
identified acts or omissions were outside
the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.
In making that determination,
the court should keep in mind that
counsel's function, as elaborated in
prevailing professional norms, is to make
the adversarial testing process work in
the particular case.
At the same time,
the court should recognize that counsel is
strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance and make all
significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable judgment.
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Ibid.
With respect to the defendant's burrlen to show
prejudice if he or she is able to show that particular errors
of counsel were unreasonable, the Supreme Court stated:
Even if a defendant shows that particular
errors of counsel were unreasonable,
therefore, the defendant must show that
they actually had an adverse effect on the
defense.
It is not enough for the defendant to
show that the errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.
Virtually every act or omission of counsel
would meet that test, cf. United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 u.s. 858, 866-867
(1982), and not every error that
conceivably could have influenced the
outcome undermines the reliability of the
result of the proceeding.
The defendant must show that there is a
easonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been
different.
A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.
Id. at 3073.
Appellants specifically identify seven alleged
errors committed by trial counsel which, they contend,
establish ineffective assitance of counsel and require
reversal of their convictions.

Each of those alleged errors

will be discussed separately.
Appellants cite trial counsel's opening statement to
the jury as evidence of ineffective assistance.

Admittedly,

the statement was far from eloquent, but it clearly did not
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prejudice appellants in any significant way.

In fact, because

not much was said to the jury in that statement, it probably
had little effect one way or the other.

A less than brilliant

opening statement by trial counsel simply did not deny
appellants the opportunity to present their case to the jury.
The claim that a reasonably competent defense
attorney would have moved to strike the

of Craig

Duvall, Christine Swanson, Finia Feuiaki, and Kelly powers is
completely unsupported by any law or substantive discussion as
to why that testimony should have been stricken, or whether it
was even likely the trial court would have granted such a
request.

Without more, appellants claim is highly

speculative.
Appellants argue that trial counsel failed
effectively to impeach a State's witness because counsel did
not have preliminary hearing transcripts which allegedly
contained prior inconsistent statements.

However, the record

indicates that counsel had some transcript of a prior
proceeding in his possission when he cross-examined the
witness (see R. 501).

Furthermore, there is nothing in the

record to show that the preliminary hearing transcripts, if
counsel in fact did not have them, contained prior
inconsistent statements that would have been helpful for
impeachment purposes.

It is well settled that this Court

cannot rule on matters outside the trial court record.
state v. Bingham, Utah,

See

No. 18774, slip op. at p.5
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(decided June 13, 1984).
Of some concern is trial counsel's failure to object
to questions about appellant Mildred Lairby's decision to
remain silent after being advised of her Miranda rights after
arrest.

Eliciting evidence of a defendant's decision to

exercise his or her constitutional right to remain silent, or
prosecutorial comment thereon, may violate a
against self-incrimination.

right

see DOyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610

(1976); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); State v.
Hales, Utah, 652 P.2d 1290 (1982); State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639
P.2d 146 (1981).

Thus, it was error for appellants' counsel

not to object to the questions asked by the prosecutor (see R.
556) and to himself ask questions about the subject (see R.
557-558).

The issue then is whether this error was

prejudicial to appellants.
In Wiswell, this Court stressed that it was the
prosecutor's repeated efforts to elicit testimony about the
defendant's post-arrest silence and his comment thereon in
final argument that resulted in prejudice to the defendant.
See 639 P.2d at 147.

However, it was implied in Wiswell and

expressed more clearly in State v. Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292,
that evidence of or comments on a defendant's silence does not
automatically result in prejudicial error.

Curative

instructions, for instance, are an important consideration for
reviewing courts.

See Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292.

Also, Wiswell

implied that if the improper evidence or prosecutorial comment

-26-

is not extensive, reversible error may not result.

see

Wiswell, 639 P.2d at 147-148, including the dissenting opinion
of C.J. Hall.
In the present case, the evidence of Mildred
Lairby's post-arrest silence was quite limited,
comment on it in closing argument,

There was no

Additionally, the trial

judge, having admonished counsel not to menti9n the subject in
final argument {see R. 797-798), specifically instructed the
jury "that no presumption or inference adverse to [Mildred
Lairby)

is to arise from the fact that she exercised her

constitutional right to speak to an attorney.•
Instruction No. 27 (R. 128).

See

Under these circumstances, the

error of counsel and, quite frankly,

the possible error of the

trial court in not striking the improper evidence on its own
motion, did not amount to prejudicial error.

The situation

here is clearly distinguishable from that in Wiswell.
Appellants'

further claims concerning failure tc

object to the admission of a "highly prejudicial document"
without ever having seen or requested to see the document,
failure effectively to elicit character evidence, and failure
to give an effective closing argument can be disposed of
rather summarily.

The record indicates that counsel asked to

read the letter referred to by appellants and that he
initially objected to its admission {see R. 730, 734).
Although counsel experienced some difficulty in questioning
"character witnesses,• he was able to elicit some reputation
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evidence that may have been of value to appellants.
Furthermore, on appeal appellants make now showing that these
character witnesses had anything substantial to offer.
Finally, although counsel's closing argument may not be the
one appellants' present counsel would have given, it fairly
presented to the jury appellants' case.

Appellants fail to

point to anything in particular to support their conclusion
that the argument "fell far below the level of quality
expected fran a reasonably canpetent defense attorney."

See

Appellants' Supplemental Brief at pp. 9-10.
Appellants bear the burden of establishing
ineffective assistance of counsel by demonstrable, not
speculative, proof; and they must show that "any deficiency in
the performance of counsel was prejudicial."
P.2d at 1109.
3071.

Codianna, 660

see also Strickland v. Washington, 35 CrL at

Appellants' proof with respect to counsel's alleged

errors being unreasonable is largely speculative.

With

respect to the prejudice canponent the lack of merit in
appellants' claim is even more evident.

They do not even

argue that without counsel's alleged errors "there was a
'reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different
result.'.

•

Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109.

Nor does a review

of the entire record and the substantial evidence presented
against appellants suggest a reasonable likelihood of a
different result without the alleged errors which, if errors
at all, were not "so serious as to deprive [appellants] of a

-28-

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable,"

Strickland, 35

CrL at 3071.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing,

the

judgments and

sentences of the trial court should be affirmed,
RESPECTFULLY sut:rnitte<'I this 15th day of June, 19B4,
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